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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Corporations - First Amendment Rights
State ex rel Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d
112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974)
N AUGUST 9, 1972 the Relators, Greater Cincinnati Gay Society,
tendered articles of incorporation for a non-profit corporation to the
Secretary of State of Ohio, under provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.'
The Secretary of State refused to accept the incorporation papers,
however, claiming that the purpose of the group, which was to promote
acceptance of homosexuality as a valid life style, was contrary to public
policy,2 since homosexuality was then a criminal act.3
The Relators then filed a motion in the Supreme Court of Ohio
asking for a writ of mandamus which would require the Secretary of State
to accept, approve, file and record the proposed articles of incorporation.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Grant v. Brown,4 while
acknowledging that the Secretary of State's reasoning was invalid s still
denied the writ on the basis of public policy.6 The court held:
Although homosexual acts between consenting adults are no longer
statutory offenses, since the new criminal code came into effect, there
is still reason for denying the writ. We agree with the Secretary of
State that the promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style is
contrary to public policy of the State. 7
Although the dissenters acknowledged the existence of a first
amendment question, 8 they chose to base their dissent upon the theory
that the Secretary of State's position is merely ministerial and, therefore,
he lacks the authority to refuse proposed articles of incorporation. The
dissent rests on three basic arguments.
1 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.07 (A) (Page 1968): "When articles of incorporation
and other certificates relating to the corporation are filed with the Secretary of State,
he shall, if he finds that they comply with the provisions of Sections 1702.01 to
1702.58, inclusive, of the Revised Code, endorse thereon his approval...."
2 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.03 (Page 1960): "A corporation may be formed for
any purpose or purposes for which natural persons lawfully may associate themselves...."
3See Law of October 1, 1953, Ch. 29 § 2905.44 (1953) Ohio Laws 417 § 1 (repealed
1974).
4 State ex rel Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
5 Under House Bill 511 it is no longer a crime to engage in homosexual acts. See
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01-.09 (Page Special Supp. 1973).
6 39 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
71d.
8 39 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 313 N.E.2d at 851 (Stern, J., dissenting): .... the United States
Constitution (First Amendment) dofes] contain, however, a bias in favor of permitting
people to speak their minds and promote their causes in a peaceful manner."
[375]
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First, they argue that the legislature and not the Secretary of State is
responsible for creating public policy.9 The dissent thus interprets the
legislative act of repealing the crime of sodomy as an assertion by
the legislature that homosexual acts between consenting adults is no
longer contrary to public policy.10 Since it is well settled that a state's
public policy is determined by the legislature," the conclusion reached
by the dissent appears valid.
Secondly, they argue that a "lawful purpose" is defined by statutory
language and not by an amorphous doctrine of public policy.12 The
equating of public policy with "unlawful purpose" has been severely
criticized in two recent New York cases.
In Association For the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v.
Shapiro,'3 a certificate of incorporation had been denied Freedom of
Choice because the association advocated the acceptance of bigotry and
segregation' 4 which are unlawful under the Constitution'
5 and laws' 6 of
the State of New York. The denial was upheld in two lower court
decisions' 7 before being reversed by the New York Court of Appeals,
which held it is perfectly lawful for a group to organize for the purpose
of changing existing laws.' 8 The court then concluded that "the public
policy of the State is not violated by purposes which are not unlawful and
to hold otherwise would be a contradiction in terms."'
9
9 Id.
10 See I. SCHROADER AND L. KArz, Omo CRImINAL LAW 73 (1974) (sexual activity of
whatever kind between assenting adults in private ought not be a crime); see generally,
Code, 23 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 1, 30 (1974) (Representative Tulley's amendment to
make homosexual acts a criminal offense under the new code was defeated).
l1See State v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); LeForce v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969).
1229 Ohio St. 2d at 116-117, 313 N.E.2d at 850. See Gay Activists Alliance v.
Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973); Ass'n For
Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961). Compare Law of May 5, 1933, Ch. 15 § 7201 Ohio Law 289,
Art. II § 201 (repealed 1972), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 7311 (Supp. 1974), and
N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFrr CORP. LAW § 201(A) (McKinney 1970). But see In re
Excavating Mach. Owners Ass'n, 25 Misc. 2d 419, 205 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
In re Stillwell Political Club, 26 Misc. 2d 931, 109 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In
re Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n, 26 Misc. 2d 995, 53 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
13 Ass'n For the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d 376, 174
N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
14 Id. at 380, 174 N.E.2d at 488, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
15 See N.Y. CONST. Art. 1 § 11: "No person shall because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subject to any discrimination in his civil rights...
16 See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAW § 40-41 (McKinney 1948) (no discrimination in place
of public accommodations); N.Y. EDU. LAW § 313 (McKinney 1969) (no discrimina-
tion in education); N.Y. Exac. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1972) (no discrimination in
employment).
17 See Ass'n For Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct., 1959); aff'd 18 Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
18 9 N.Y.2d at 383,174 N.E.2d at 490,214 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
19 9 N.Y.2d at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489,214 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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Freedom of Choice was followed by Gay Activists Alliance v.
Lomenzo,2 whose facts are identical with those in Brown. In Gay
Alliance, the Secretary of State of New York refused to accept the
incorporation papers of the Gay Activists contending that while it is not
unlawful to advocate homosexuality, it is "still unlawful to engage in
homosexual activities in New York," 2' and thereby the group's purpose
was contrary to public policy.2 2 The court of appeals reversed
the Secretary of State's action, holding that "since in the present case the
appellants acknowledge that the formal requirements were complied with
and the purpose for which the corporation is to be formed offends no
law, the Secretary of State lacked the authority to label the purposes
violative of public policy." 23
The third argument is that the Secretary of State's position is merely
ministerial, in that his discretion is limited to particulars contained within
the Ohio Revised Code. Therefore, the use of public policy arguments
by the Secretary of State is an abuse of his discretion and a denial of the
Relator's fourteenth amendment rights of due process and equal protection.24
Traditionally the fourteenth amendment has been invoked to curtail
abusive acts by public officials in administrative proceedings, 25 as well as
in the issuance of licenses 26 and permits.2 7 Although fourteenth amendment
rights have been asserted sparingly 28 and indirectly 29 in the area of
incorporation, the general rule that has evolved is that the statutes of the
jurisdiction define the limits of official discretion. Thus a violation of
the fourteenth amendment results when either: (1) a statute or rule is
20 Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d
108 (1973).
21See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1967): "A person is guilty of consensual
sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person."
22 Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 66 Misc. 2d 456, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct.
1971), rev'd, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
23 31 N.Y.2d at 966, 293 N.E.2d at 256, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
24 29 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 313 N.E.2d at 850.
25 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Peeble, 220 F.2d
114 (7th Cir. 1955); Bogan v. New London Housing Authority, 366 F. Supp. 861(D. Conn. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp 1062 (D. Fla. 1973); Clean Air
Constituency v. Cal. St. Air. Resource Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1974).26 See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Glicker v. Michigan
Liquor Control Comm'r, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947).
27 See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
28 See Consumers Co-Op Ass'n v. Arm, 163 Kan. 489, 183 P.2d 453 (1947); Bologno
v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1959); Church v.
Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 133 N.E.2d 333 (1955).
The court rarely refers to the fourteenth amendment by name. In most instances
the courts use terms such as arbitrary, capricious and beyond discretion which have
been associated with fourteenth amendment rights. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
Winter, 1975]
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arbitrarily applied by the official or (2) the limits set by the statute
are too vague.
30
The refusal by the Secretary of State in Brown to file the proposed
articles of incorporation seemingly falls within the first criterion. The Ohio
Revised Code adequately defines the requirements for incorporation.
3
'
Therefore, the use of public policy arguments by the Secretary of State
results in a capricious application of the statutes involved. A similar
conclusion was reached by the courts in Freedom of Choice3 2 and
Gay Alliance.33
All three arguments seem persuasive but the first amendment
argument, mentioned but left undeveloped by the dissent, would seem
even more decisive. Under such an analysis the majority opinion in
Brown should be viewed as the most recent attempt by a state to restrict
freedom of speech and association to those groups which profess
controversial and unpopular ideas.
The state's power to grant incorporation, licenses, and permits has
traditionally been used to regulate freedom of speech and association.
3 4
3o See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Cases cited notes 27 and 29 supra.
31 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.01 et seq. (Page 1964) (Non-Profit Corporation
Law); Oro REv. CODE ArN. § 2907-2907.37 (Page's Spec. Supp. 1973). See also
State ex rel Grant v. Brown, 29 Ohio St. 2d 112, 116, 313 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1974)
(Stem, J., dissenting): "[tihe existence of 58 distinct statutes serves more to circum-
scribe and limit whatever discretionary authority the Secretary of State does possess."
329 N.Y.2d at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489; 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391:
Within such a scope the individual Justice would be at liberty to indulge in his
own personal predilections as to the purposes of a proposed corporation, and
impose his own personal views as to the social, political and economic maatters
involved. This is the direct antithesis of judicial objectivity, especially in an
ex parte proceeding where no evidence is taken.
3331 N.Y.2d at 966, 293 N.E.2d at 256, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 109: "mhe Secretary of
State's refusal to accept the petitioner's certificate was arbitrary, being in excess
of his authority."
34Between the period of 1896-1950 States frequently denied incorporation to those
groups whose policies were either unlawful or contrary to public policy. See e.g. In re
Lithuanian Workers' Literature Soc'y, 196 App. Div. 262, 187 N.Y.S. 612 (Ct. App.
1921) (advocated socialism); In re Stillwell Political Club, 26 Misc. 2d 931, 109
N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1951) (advocated extreme nationalism); In re
Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n, 26 Misc. 2d 995, 53 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co.
1945) (wanted to amend Constitution to alienate any person or group that criticizes
or teaches violent overthrow of government). See generally, Comment, Judicial
Approval as a Prerequisite to Incorporation of Non-Profit Organization in New York
and Pennsylvania, 55 COL. L. Rev. 380 (1955).
However, the courts have allowed incorporation of an unpopular group, when
judge or secretary of state has personally agreed with the group's philosophy. See In
re Good Thief Foundation, 47 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1944) (moral
betterment and rehabilitation of inmates of prisons or penal institutions); In re
Certificate of Incorporation of the German Jewish Children's Aid, 151 Misc. 834, 272
N.Y.S. 540 (1934) (to facilitate the entry of German Jewish children into the
United States).
Incorporation has also been denied where associations conduct activities that are
adequately performed by other organizations. See In re Excavating Macl. Owner's
Ass'n, 25 Misc. 2d 419, 205 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In re Council of Orthodox
Rabbis, 10 Misc. 2d 62, 171 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1958); In re Waldemar Cancer
[Vol 8:2
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The Gay Society of Cincinnati, through incorporation, sought to obtain
those privileges which result from corporate status.35 As a result of these
benefits, Relators would be elevated to a position where they could more
effectively challenge discriminatory laws against homosexuals.35
The State of Ohio, by denying the Relators the ability of incorpora-
tion, has thereby effectively limited the exchange of ideas on the issue of
homosexuality. Thus, under the rationale of the Brown case any group
of individuals wishing to maintain the status quo would be permitted to
incorporate, while those who advocate change would be relegated to the
status of an unincorporated group. This seems to be clearly contrary to
the first amendment right of freedom of speech and association.
Although the courts have not dealt specifically with the states' power
to grant incorporation as a means of restricting first amendment rights,
they have attacked the states' inhibition of first amendment rights through
the use of permits3 7 and licenses.3 8 The two basic principles that have
developed from these cases in the area of first amendment rights are:
(1) Although first amendment rights are not absolute,39 a slight infringe-
Research Ass'n, 205 Misc. 560, 130 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (already have the
American Cancer Society).
Regarding licenses see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cox v.New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.1964). Regarding permits see Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
33Two major advantages of incorporation are: (1) limited liability, see OHIo REv.CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1) (Page Supp. 1973) ("A corporation may indemnify or
agree to indemnify a director, officer or employee. ), and (2) tax benefits, see
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 § 501(C) (3).
36 Homosexuals have been discriminated against in areas of: (1) employment, see
McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182(D.C. Cir. 1965); (2) marriage, see Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185(1971); (3) child custody cases, see Nadler v. Superior Courts, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523,63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); cf. In re J.S.C. 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (Sup. Ct.1974); (4) naturalization proceedings, see Boutilier v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), and, (5) housing, see E. Chaitin v. V. Lefcourt, Is Gay
Suspect, 8 LINCOLN L. REv. 24, 28 (1973).37See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).38 Licensing that is arbitrary has been stricken down by the courts. See, e.g., Cox v.New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n,160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947). Although there were earlier cases expressing a contrary
view, e.g., Murphy's Tavern Inc. v. Davis, 70 N.J. Super. 87, 175 A.2d 1 (1961), andPaddock Bar Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 46 N.J. Super. 405, 134A.2d 779 (1957), it is now generally held that, absent any indecent or immoral
conduct, the mere fact that homosexuals gather in a licensed premise is an insufficientground to suspend or revoke a liquor license. See Vallerga v. Department of AlcoholicBeverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 313, 347 P.2d 909, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1960); One ElevenWines & Liquor Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 50 N.J. 329, 235 A.2d
12(1967).
3 9 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1912).
Winter 1975]
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ment may be held to constitute a violation; 4 and, (2) even though a
person has no right to a valuable governmental benefit 4' he may not be
denied that benefit in a manner that infringes upon his constitutional
rights." Based upon these principles, the courts have developed rules
which have apparently been disregarded by the majority in Brown.
The first rule disregarded by the court in Brown is that there can be
no condition precedent on a benefit that is bestowed under the law.
43
Thus, conditions on welfare benefits," unemployment compensation, 45 tax
exemptions," public employment, 47 and bar admissions" have all been
invalidated as a prior condition on a right that already exists.49 The court
in Brown has sanctioned the use of conditions on the right of incorporation
by requiring groups that seek incorporation to profess the same ideas as
the state officials who pass upon their articles of incorporation. Such
actions are clearly contrary to the cases that have developed in the
last quarter century.
The second rule which the Brown court failed to follow deals with
the right to associate to further ideas. An association, by providing the
individual with both economic and physical resources, 50 enhances effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, especially in
controversial areas. 5' For this reason, the right of association is considered
essential to minority groups and is therefore rarely restricted.
52 Since
sponsors of a denied corporation still have a right to associate to advance
4OSee Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); See also Hannegan v. Esquire,
327 U.S. 146 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
41See Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 441 (1894) (the right of incorporation depends
solely upon the grace of the state and is not a right inherent in the parties).
42 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
43 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 137 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for
welfare overturned). But cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upheld home
visits by case worker as a condition precedent for assistance).
45 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denied unemployment compensation
because unable to work on Sabbath).
46 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax exemption to claimants who
engaged in certain forms of speech).
47 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
48Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (a state may not exercise power
to select their own bars in such a way as to infringe upon freedom of political
association). But see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154 (1971) (loyalty oath as requisite for bar admission upheld).
49But see American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Here, the
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute which required labor union officials, as a
condition precedent to use N.L.R.B. facilities, to file a non-communist affidavit. The
Court justified this action on the grounds that communist leadership of organized
labor would pose a clear and present danger to the national interest.
50 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
51 N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
52 See Braid v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
[Vol. 8:2
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their beliefs,0 the question is whether a denial of incorporation violates
the first amendment.
The basic reason for associating is to acquire certain advantages,
i.e., support, finance and security, which unless obtained places an
individual at a severe disadvantage when competing against other existing
groups. In Healy v. James,54 Relators were denied recognition by a
university because of their political beliefs. 55 The Supreme Court held
there can be no doubt that denial of official recognition to college
organizations, without justification, burdens or abridges their associational
rights. "The primary impediments to free association following from
non-recognition is the denial of use of common facilities for meeting
and other appropriate purposes."56
An act may be merely restrictive, rather than prohibitive, and still
abridge a first amendment right.57 The fact that Gay Society of Cincinnati
will lose tax exemption and indemnification is analogous to the students in
Healy who lost their right to use college facilities. In both cases, the
groups were ill-equipped to advance their beliefs and ideas, thereby
defeating the purpose behind the right to associate. 58
Finally, the Brown decision sanctioned the use of prior restraint of a
first amendment right. Under the doctrine of prior restraint, a state is not
entitled to regulate in advance what expressions and ideas will be
expressed.59 The doctrine of prior restraint, though usually associated
with the area of censorship of newspapers,60 books 6' and movies,6 2 has
been extended into the area of licensing and permits. By retaining the
power to either issue or withhold permits and licenses, for the use of public
53See Ass'n For the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 18 Misc. 2d 534,
188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
54 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-183 (1972). See also Gay Students Organization
v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H. 1974).
55 Students were members of S.D.S.
56 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
5T See cases cited note 40 supra.
58 See N.L.R.B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913 (6th Cir. 1940): "Mhe right
to form opinions is of little value if such opinions cannot be expressed, and the
right to express it is of little value if it may not be communicated to those immedi-
ately concerned."
59 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (previous restraint of newspaper unconsti-
tutional); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (prior restraint of a
first amendment right is unconstitutional); cf. Organization For a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (prior restraint on expression comes to the court
with a heavy presumption against constitutional validity).60See New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (government
attempt to stop printing of Pentagon papers).
6iSee Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (sale of books to juveniles
limited).
62See Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1951) (attempt to ban movie by
denying license).
RECENT CASEs
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facilities, parks and streets,63 a municipality can effectively limit the free-
dom of speech and association of unpopular groups." It is this situation
that the Supreme Court, in Staub v. City of Baxley,65 addressed itself:
It is undeniable that the ordinance authorized the Mayor and the
Council of the City of Baxley to grant or refuse to grant the required
permit in their uncontrolled discretion. It thus makes enjoyment of
speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and Council of the
City although the fundamental right is made free from congressional
abridgment by the first amendment and is protected by the fourteenth
from invasion 'by state action.... For these reasons the ordinance
on its face imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint upon the
enjoyment of first amendment freedoms and lays a forbidden burden
upon exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.
e6
Although "prior restraint" has been limited in the past to the area of
licensing and permits, its rationale should be applicable in the area
of incorporation. Thus the State of Ohio, in denying incorporation
rights, is restraining freedom of speech in the area of homosexuality
before the topic is debated in the public forum. This seems an obvious
violation of the rule against prior restraint.
One could limit the Brown decision to the facts presented, thereby
accepting a rationale that is both inaccurate as well as naive. Viewed
broadly, however, the homosexuals in Brown are merely additional
victims of government action thwarting basic civil rights. At this level
Brown represents an unfortunate affirmation of a state's power to restrict
the freedom of speech and association of those groups that profess
controversial ideas. The weakness in viewing Brown narrowly is that it
justifies the abandonment of fundamental and basic principles. It was to
this rationale that Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California,67 addressed himself: "If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
68
THEODORE DAVID ITZKOWITZ
63 See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163, 164 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
64 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
65 Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
6 ld. at 325.
67 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
as Id.
[Vol. 8:2
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